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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD FITZWATER,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden
Utah State Prison,

:

Case No. 14569

Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Richard Fitzwater, appeals from the decision
of the Third Judicial District Court denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that his confinement by respondent at the
Utah State Prison was illegal and invalid.

The matter came on

for hearing on March 25, 1976, before the Honorable F. Baldwin,
Jr., who denied the petition with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Richard Fitzwater seeks a reversal of the court below
with directions that he be released from respondent's custody.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Richard Fitzwater, was committed to the Utah
State Prison for the crime of possession of a stolen motor vehicle
on October 31, 1974, after being convicted by a jury.
At that trial Jack W. Kunkler was his attorney.

(R.9)

(T.7)

Approximately one month before the case went to trial,
Mr. Fitzwater testified in support of his allegation that Mr.
Kunkler was not competent counsel in his behalf, Mr. Fitzwater
spoke with Mr. Kunkler in the Salt Lake County Jail.

(T.12)

Mr. Fitzwater gave the names of three witnesses on his behalf who
could assist him in a trial.

(T.12)

At the trial Anthony Buck

did not appear and Mr. Kunkler refused to use Anthony Buck as a
witness.

(T.13)

Mr. Fitzwater said that Mr. Buck could have given

testimony favorable to him.
Mr. Kunkler testified at the hearing on the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus that he recalled Mr. Fitzwater being upset
at trial about a witness not being present.

Mr. Kunkler did not

recall whether or not he had ever heard the name Anthony Buck at the
time of Appellant Fitzwater's trial.

(T. 24,25,26).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING
HIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS
DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT HIS TRIAL,.

-2-

. ~c- s - a r i a re

re:cenizes

t h a c the

:-

c:mDeten f .

"-;*'- a.- : :> wrm: :

failure

or o r o o - r

: e- t r " e s e u

uuiL r e r e : ^
11 ^ .
wno s : o v s

\ ;• a ^ b i t a n c e

- <•• ', : n r e ^ >

•*~h f^ - • L »r>,-...

*:

-a*

?f a n \

.

viz.c

.sc i • - v a i u a c - . i g a p a r t :

.. .* t

r

cc--. -«
a t i o r . of

if

accepts.

~uc:c:^

-

', ckerv

;*:

-.

< /-

'UF--*?'-

fore i t s

umpredictab i i i t j .

deprives

hir. ::f a r e a 3 o n a : l c

*

:? *r a r a n t

>

.-^-%

^ ;

render

c o u r t s of a r ^ e a l - ,r

-

course

. o make :--.
-randarc

:as
compared

.r.Ct

". - r

-, *

^competence

.*:

~r e f f e c t i v e
:.c

.^ a, ~c

reDresent-

--a

.JHUU.

vague

tie;

. i: le a < i
^oportunicy

-«.,.,;::-. q e r ^ u ^
a._-

*

iKamired ~r

-^' -:•?=•*•?
rt

c c ^ * r . .:.

" -^ ; -i. :

f o r t h e examp 1*2, Lite I ,i I I.owj.ng

~

^1

_.i^ prz z ^.s.- . i ~

-.. - s u b j e c t i v e

as-isr.ance r:

: ' ..

- ...
c o u r . s e ; musr

zr-ai

"^ail^-Iz^o

: i r . i c o ~-.

-

s~~ndarc

~andaru

„n:ir-s:-

-

vhau h a s :eer* ?" y/ic ^ c c e p c a o l e OJ. a i . a c c e p t d ^ . ;

s::rir^ent

*r

a- v \ ^

. a.

^ ~c ' e f f e c t i v e

The m o s t w i i ^ . -

set

- •

-randa-r

bee^ r e . . ^ . ; .
with

__

\~ f' •? *

• • - - .<- " ' : i c s u c h a

LO GecerT?:re v ^ t - i ' - e ^

states

*?

t

. a e n t i f v hi_T.Sc If w i t h ; r c

11n u n d e r tJne -.av ^ric . c n s i s i ^ ^ r
-' . *

. a l i

.:u":c.

:efendant
o: :?cng accuii.'-^
-.

prejudicial

v,:ienever

^ : -

:;ot

± : .

/ followed

^.ases:

-3-

there

such a s e a n c a r c

See,

Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. 1945)
Latimer v. Cramer, 214 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1954)
Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965)
Lance v. Overdate, 2T4 F. 2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957)
O'Malley v. U.S., 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961)
James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1964)
U.S. v. Gonzolez, 321 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1960)
Some courts have more recently begun to formulate more
appropriate standards.

For example, in Scott v. U.S., 427 F.2d

609 (D.C. Cir. 1970) wherein the court held that a Defendant is
required to show that counsel's "gross incompetence blotted out
the essence of substantial defense" to prevail on a claim of inadequate
representation.

Several California cases have followed this approach.

See, for example:
People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1969)
People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 F.2d 97, 73
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968)
People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963)
This test has the advantage of allowing a reviewing court
to concentrate on a single defense rather than the entire trial.
However, this test also provides no guidance for determining what
is gross incompetence but only suggests finding of prejudice once
gross incompetence is established.
Some more recent standards have evolved which should make
it easier for appellate courts to review appeals which bring into
issue the constitutional right to effective counsel and which insure
that the right is in fact a day-to-day fact of life in our nation's
trial courts.

The Third Circuit in Moore v. United States, 432 F.

2d 730 (1970) would measure the effectiveness of counsel by using

-4-

the touch stone of

fl

community standards" and this way it has

in essence adopted that part of the law of torts that recognizes
the duty of care but has dropped the requirement that damage be
shown.
The Fourth Circuit has delineated certain positive duties
owed by defense counsel.

In order to meet the Fourth Circuitfs

test for effective representation counsel must, under Coles v.
Peyton, 398 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968),
1.

Confer with the client early, and as often as necessary;

2.

Advise him of his rights;

3.

Ascertain all defenses that may be available and

develop all appropriate defenses;
4.

Conduct all necessary investigations;

5-

Allow himself time for reflection and preparation.

In cases such as State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super, 507, 287 A.
2d 234 (App. Div. 1971); Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D.
Ohio 1968); State v. White, 5 Wash. App. 283, 487 P.2d 242 (1971),
rev'd 81 Wash. 2d 223, 500 P.2d 1242 (1972); and State v. Fulford,
290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W. 2d 270 (1971), it has been recognized that
an effectiveness of counsel standard would be more funtional if it
were more like malpractice standards.

Several such tests have been

formulated such as: whether counsel's performances was at the level
of normal competency, or of normal customary skill and knowledge,
or whether the attorney performed at least as well as any attorney
with ordinary training in the legal profession, or exercises the
usual amount of skill and judgment exhibited by an attorney conscientic
-5-

seeking to protect his client's interests, or Mto hold counsels
assistance ineffective if no reasonable attorney would have so
acted".

These provide a standard capable of application by a court

since the court could evaluate a particular attorney's practice

in

light of the normal and customary skill exhibited in the courtroom.
Under such formulations the relevant questions should be whether
counsel's behavior was such that reasonable, competent and fairly
experienced defense lawyers might debate its propriety.

If such

debate may exist, assistance would not be in effective.

Such a

finding of ineffective representation should reverse the defendants
conviction if counsel's conduct created a reasonable possibility
of contributing to that conviction.
In

the

State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W. 2d 1 (1973)

Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the ABA Standards for the

Defense Function as partial guidelines to the determination of effectrv
representation.
In short, a test which focuses on whether defense counsel
held up his part in the judicial process and examines whether defense
counsel in a particular case fulfilled his role in relation to the
judge and prosecutor is more workable than prior "mockery of justice"
tests which have concentrated on the trial as a whole searching for
such gross incompetence that would force an appellate court "gripping
the arms of their chars"

to reverse and remand.

-6-

The Sixth Circuit in Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687 (1974) recently withdrew from the "mockery of justice11
group and now uses a more objective ground.

They upheld that the

assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is:
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance. It is a violation of this
standard for defense counsel to deprive a criminal
defendant of a substantial defense by his own
ineffectiveness of incompetence. (Citing cases)
Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a
lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law
and must conscientiously protect his client's interests,
undeflected by conflicting considerations. (Citing
cases) . . . Defense counsel must investigate all
apparently substantial defenses available to the
defendant and must assert them in a proper and timely
matter. (Citing cases) . . . Defense strategy
and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and
skill in the criminal law would not consider
competent deny a criminal defendant the effective
assistance of counsel, if some other action would have
better protected the defendant and was reasonably
forseeable as such before trial. (Citing cases)
If, however, action that appears erroneous from
hindsight was taken for a reason that would appear
sound to a competent criminal attorney, the assistance
of counsel has not been constitutionally defective.
Appellant thus contends that under any of the above
objective standards the failure to investigate and call a witness
that a criminal defendant advises counsel would be of assistance
in his defense is incompetence under the above formulations in that
such failure to act blots out a substantial defense and contributed
effectively to a conviction.
rule the old Alires standard.

Petitioner urges this court to over
That is, appellant contends that the

evidence in this case shows that all defenses available under the law
were not presented because of failure

of counsel to present

a certain witness and as such appellant's conviction was obtained

-7-

without the effective assistance of counsel and therefore should
be nullified.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the court below
erred in denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus because appellant was denied due process of law at his
trial because he was not effectively represented by
counsel at trial, appellant respectfully submits that the
judgment of the court below should be reversed with directions
that appellant be released from respondent's custody.
DATED this

day of August, 1976.

Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK
Attorney for Appellant
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